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FORUM
FULTON v. STATE AND ANDERSON v. STATE:
INSURMOUNTABLE BARRIERS FOR
THE POLYGRAPH
In recent years, a discernable trend has arisen toward admitting
polygraph results in criminal trials where the prosecution and defense
stipulate prior to testing that the test results will be admissible regard-
less of the outcome.' This approach was previously adopted by Okla-
homa,2 as well as other states,3 despite the fact that polygraphic evi-
dence which is unstipulated to has generally been held inadmissible.4
Recently, this dichotomy has been eliminated in Oklahoma by the hold-
ings in Fulton v. State5 and Anderson v. State.6 In these two cases
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals banned the use of poly-
graphic evidence at trial, even though its admissibility had been agreed
to by both the prosecution and the defense.
In Fulton, the defendant was charged with first degree murder.
During its case-in-chief, the prosecution attempted to introduce testi-
mony concerning the polygraphic examination of a witness for the state.
Upon objection by the defense, the trial court excluded the testimony.
During the state's rebuttal, however, extensive testimony regarding the
polygraph test was admitted over the objections of defense counsel.
Although it is unclear from the opinion, it would appear that no stipu-
lations were made by counsel. Even so, the court stated: "[MIn light
1. See, e.g., Comment, The Polygraphic Technique A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAxn
L. REv. 330, 340-43 (1971).
2. Castleberry v. State, 522 P.2d 257 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Jones v. State, 527
P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
3. See, e.g., State v. Valdez 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Houser,
85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa, 19, 104 N.W.
2d 568 (1960); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).
4. Carson v. State, 529 P.2d 499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Mullins v. Page, 443
P.2d 773 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968); Leeks v. State, 245 P.2d 764 (Okla. Crim. App.
1952); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951).
5. 541 P.2d 871 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
6. 551 P.2d 1155 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
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of the potential unreliability of polygraph examinations at this time, we
feel that in all future cases the introduction into evidence of polygraph
examination results for any purpose, even if admitted upon stipulation
of all parties, will be error."17 By retreating to a rule of total inadmis-
sibility, the court avoided the more difficult question concerning the
standards that should be applied to determine the admissibility of
polygraphic evidence. 8
Ten months later in Anderson, the defendant, who was charged
with rape, requested permission to take a polygraph examination. The
request was denied and the defendant was subsequently convicted. On
appeal the defense argued that the refusal to permit the defendant to
take the test constituted reversible error.9 The court of criminal ap-
peals affirmed the conviction, reiterating its position taken in Fulton.
In both cases, the court referred to the potential unreliability of the
polygraph, basing this opinion on its prior decisions.' 0 To properly
understand the rejection of polygraph evidence by the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals, it is therefore necessary to examine the history
of polygraphic evidence from its emergence in the criminal justice sys-
tem to its present status in Oklahoma.
Emergence of the Polygraph as an Evidentiary Device
Some fifty-five years ago, the American criminal justice system was
7. 541 P.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
8. Although beyond the scope of this article, the reader should be aware of the
inherent theoretical controversies surrounding the standards for admission of polygraphic
evidence. In the first instance, most courts apply a judicial notice standard to the ad-
mission of polygraphic evidence, whereas several, commentators have argued that an ex-
pert witness standard should be applied. See, e.g., McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCosrck].
Moreover, if a judicial notice standard is to be maintained, the controversy sur-
rounding the proper tests for judicially recognizing facts must be settled. One position,
expounded by Maguire and Morgan, would allow judicial notice of facts that are indis-
putably certain. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE-COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw (1947);
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 I-IAv. L. REV. 269 (1944). The Wigmore-Thayer approach
would grant recognition to those facts that are more probable than not and allow the
opponent to present contrary evidence to the jury. 9 J. WiGMoRE, TREATISE ON THE
ANGLo-AMERICAN Sysm, OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2567 (3d ed.
1940); J. THAYER, A PREuImNARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 308
(1898).
Analysis of the polygraph as an evidentiary tool would tend to favor the application
of the Wigmore-Thayer approach, since it allows the recognition of polygraphic evidence
but subjects it to the test of cross-examination and thereafter allows the jury to weigh
its validity. The Maguire-Morgan approach would tend to force the polygraph to as-
sume the aura of conclusiveness.
9. 551 P.2d at 1159.
10. See id.
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confronted with the first crude polygraph in Frye v. United States.""
With few exceptions, 12 the appellate courts of this country have subse-
quently relied on the rationale of Frye in excluding polygraph evidence
in state and federal criminal trials.'8
In Frye, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided
that any testimony based on or derived from a polygraph test as it was
conducted at that time' 4 should be excluded from trial. Reasoning
from a somewhat scientific viewpoint, the court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suf-
ficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has
not gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify
the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.'
Implicit in the court's analysis were three assumptions: (1) that at
some point the polygraph must be recognized as evidence; (2) that to
be acceptable in the courts, the polygraph proponent must make a suffi-
cient, though not conclusive, showing of general acceptance in the rele-
vant scientific field; and (3) that a sufficient showing of general accept-
ance was lacking at that particular time. Thus, the polygraph admis-
sibility question was left open for future decisions, within a framework
of scientific progress.
Subsequent decisions by criminal courts, however, have failed to
11. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
13. For an analysis of the polygraph prior to Frye, see J. RED), & F. INBAU, TRUTH
AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 3-5 (1966).
14. The instrument used in Frye tested only systolic blood pressure. See 293 F. at
1013. Therefore, it did not have the accuracy and reliability of the modem four channel
equipment which also test for pulse rate, respiration rate and galvanic skin response.
Comment, The Polygraphic Technique A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 330,
330-31 (1971). Thus, the Frye court can be seen as having rationally excluded testi-
mony concerning a crude scientific device fraught with potential accuracy and reliability
defects.
15. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 12:682
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properly consider the state of modem science in the polygraph area and
have relied simply on the specific ruling in Frye.)6 The courts have
failed to recognize that since Frye there have been significant advances
in the science and training of polygraph examiners, 17 as well as tre-
mendous improvements in polygraph equipment over the simple blood
pressure device in Frye,'8 With such new evidence available, the pres-
ent exclusion approach taken by most courts appears unfounded
and unwise.
THE PoLYGRApH's HISTORY IN OKLAHOMA
In 1951, some twenty-eight years after the Frye decision, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was faced with its first opportun-
ity to rule on the admissibility of polygraphic evidence in Henderson
v. State.19 Unfortunately, after a lengthy but scientifically unsound dis-
sertation, the court chose to ignore the evolving state of the art in poly-
graphic equipment and followed the rationale and test enunciated in
Frye.20 The significance of the Henderson decision lies in the court's
reasoning prior to its retreat to the Frye rationale. The court first
looked to the New York case of People v. Forte,21 quoting with ap-
proval the issue addressed by that court and its resolution: "Can it [the
polygraph] be depended upon to operate with complete success on per-
sons of varying emotional stability? The record is devoid of evidence
tending to show a general scientific recognition that the pathometer
[polygraph] possesses efficacy. '22
16. It should be noted that later Oklahoma decisions excluding testimony concerning
polygraphic testing used the same statistics relied upon in the seminal polygraph case
in Oklahoma, Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951), even though
the statistical data was at that time outdated. See notes 27-30 infra and accompanying
text.
17. With the establishment of the American Polygraph Association as an organiza-
tion devoted to research and development and the increase of training facilities such as
the Keeler Polygraph Institute, there has been a rapid evolution in polygraph equipment
and a significant increase in trained examiners. Further, as of 1972, fifteen states had
passed mandatory minimum licensing requirements for polygraph examiners. See Ro-
mig, Status of State Polygraph Legislation in July 1972, in LEGAL ADmissmmrry OF THE
POLYGRAPH 44-53 (N. Ansley ed. 1975).
118. See Norvath, Verbal and Nonverbal Clues To Truth and Deception During
Polygraph Examinations and Ansley, Capillary Responses As A Polygraph Channel in
LEGAL ADmiSSmrirIY OF THE POLYGRAPH 189-219, 257-96 (N. Ansley ed. 1975).
19. 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951).
20. Id. at 502-04.
21. 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
22. Id. at 206, 18 N.E.2d at 32.
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Despite the Frye rationale, the court in Henderson appeared to be
asking for complete success, or 100% accuracy; a degree of reliability
beyond the capability of any humanly conceived device. One of the
reasons offered by the court in holding that polygraphic evidence
should be excluded from trial was that the machine's readings were
only 75% accurate.23  This analysis has two major flaws. First, the
court assumed, after citing the 75% accuracy rating, that the other
25% constituted true error. This assumption, however, is incorrect.
Of the remaining 25%, there is a portion of readings which are incon-
clusive, because the results do not provide a deviation significant
enough for the examiner to accurately read.24 In such a situation, the
examiner will not give a definite reading, but will term it inconclusive.
This is not error, but rather no evaluation at all.
Furthermore, in considering the 25% of the readings that were
not completely accurate, the court failed to inquire into whether this
error factor tended to exonerate a guilty person or convict an innocent
person. It has been shown that in almost all polygraph errors, the error
lies in the machine's failure to detect a lie rather than its miscategoriza-
tion of a truth as a lie.25 Finally, it should be noted that the standard
the court applied to the admissibility of polygraphic evidence was not
one of general admissibility of evidence, but rather one of judicial no-
tice.26
After concluding that the polygraph's degree of accuracy was de-
ficient, the Henderson court went on to note an extensive list of emo-
tional, mental and physical factors which give rise to difficulties in the
reading and interpretation of polygraph charts.21 Although such fac-
tors may have been problematic with the first crude polygraphs, they
have been isolated and dealt with through the improvement of poly-
graph equipment and the higher level of competency of trained poly-
graph examiners. 28
In its final analysis before adopting the Frye rationale, the court
looked for support from Dean Wigmore, who was highly critical of the
23. 94 Okla. Crim. -, 230 P.2d at 501.
24. Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and
Deception, 62 . CIuM. L.C. & P.S. 276, 278 (1971).
25. Id. at 279.
26. Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of Its Place in the Law of Evidence,
10 WAYNE L. Rav. 381, 383-86 (1964).
27. 94 Okla. Crim. -, 230 P.2d at 501-02.
28. Note, The Polygraph Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 4 SUrOLK L.
Rnv. 111, 119-23 (1969) [hereinafter cited as The Polygraph].
[Vol. 12:682
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polygraph in his treatise on evidence.29 It is arguable, however, that
the court's reliance on Wigmore was somewhat misplaced. In the first
instance, the comments of Dean Wigmore were woefully outdated; his
work was published in 1931, long before much of the polygraph re-
search and development took place. Secondly, Dean Wigmore's com-
ments were made about the polygraph test being used in the 1930s, a
simple blood pressure test similar to that used in Frye.0 As previously
pointed out, no serious comparison could be made between the blood
pressure polygraph and the four channel machine in use at the time
Henderson was decided.
After looking at the history of the polygraph, the court concluded,
as had the court in Frye, that the polygraph had not "attained such
scientific and psychological accuracy, nor its operators such sureness of
interpretation of figures on a dial that the testimony here in question
was competent, over objection, for submission to a jury holding the fate
of the defendant in its hands." 1
In succeeding years, the court of criminal appeals frequently con-
fronted the issue of admissibility of polygraphic evidence. 32 However,
until the decisions in Fulton and Anderson, the court continued to re-
iterate the language of Frye or rely on its own past decisions without
explanation.
UNDERLYING RATIONALE FOR EXCLUSION
A close reading of Fulton and Anderson, as well as prior cases
in Oklahoma, reveals three broad areas of criticism of polygraph evi-
dence which are typically posited as grounds for exclusion. These
areas may best be catagorized as: (1) scientific criticisms; (2) jury
system criticisms; and (3) constitutional criticisms.
Scientific Criticisms
1. The polygraph does not have scientific validation (reliability).
Since the Frye decision, the argument that polygraphic evidence
is unreliable has been adopted frequently in criminal decisions. Al-
though rationally founded at the time of Frye, this argument has been
29. 94 Okla. Crim. -, 230 P.2d at 503.
30. See J. WiGMoRE, THE PNcNrPLEs OF JuDicIuL PRooF 615-21 (2d ed. 1931).
31. Id. at 504.
32. See cases at notes 2 and 4 supra.
1977]
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rendered virtually obsolete by technological developments in the poly-
graph field. It has been noted that:
The leading text in this field, written by judicially recognized
experts, represents a professional study of over 35,000 sub-jects and covers a span of some thirty-three years. The au-
thors agreed that "[tihe percentage of known errors . . . . is
less than one percent." Of further consequence is the fact
that "the relatively few errors that do occur favor the inno-
cent, since the known mistakes in diagnosis almost always in-
volve a failure to detect the lies of the guilty subjects rather
,than a finding of lying on the part of a truth-telling, innocent
person." This type of reliable study cannot be ignored in
any inquiry into the legal status of the polygraph.83
This type of long term reliability study with its report of a low incidence
of error should be a strong indication of the reliability and scientific
validity of the polygraph and should fairly answer the courts' criticisms
in this regard.
Regarding the apparently strict requirement of scientific reliabil-
ity, courts are asking more of the polygraph than of any other expert
testimony adduced at criminal trials. Courts never require, for in-
stance, that a psychiatrist be virtually one hundred percent accurate be-
fore he is allowed to testify. All that is required is that he must be
qualified as an expert. No more should be required of the polygraph
examiner. Any defects or deficiencies in either the scientific device
or the examiner should come to light on cross-examination. F. Lee
Bailey has stated that:
It may be argued that dealing with polygraph experts at a
trial is no different than dealing with any other expert. The
polygraph tracings mean nothing without the examiner's
testimony regarding his interpretation of the tracings. His
testimony is subject to cross-examination, his qualifications
and methods employed are subject to attack, and other ex-
perts might be employed to refute his testimony.84
These checks and balances have proven effective with other expert wit-
nesses and should be equally effective with the polygraph expert. It
is suggested that the polygraph has a level of reliability sufficient to
justify admissibility. Any error that might occur can be checked and
controlled by the traditional tools of advocacy.
33. The Polygraph, supra note 29, at 117 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omit-
ted).
34. F. BAILEY, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASEs 199 ('1970).
[Vol. 12:682
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2. Because of the lack of scientific validation, the polygraph has
not attained the scientific acceptance required by the Frye decision.
Although the court in Frye concluded that relevant scientific fields
for polygraph evidence were psychology and physiology,35 it should be
emphasized that the polygraph has more recently developed a field and
science of its own.3 6 Consequently, the limited definitions in Frye
should be modified to include those people working in the "science of
polygraphics." Further, the use of the polygraph is widespread in law
enforcement, government and private industry. With such widespread
use, it must be concluded that the polygraph is in a field of its own
and should be measured accordingly.
Once these parameters are delineated, courts have generally
viewed the next step as a determination of whether the polygraph has
gained sufficient standing and acceptance to justify admitting it as evi-
dence. However, such an inquiry seems improper to determine admis-
sibility. As pointed out by Professor McCormick:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for tak-
ing judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclu-
sions which are supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received unless there are other reasons for exclu-
sion. Particularly, probative value may be overborne by the
familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and
undue consumption of time. If the courts used this ap-
proach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement of "gen-
eral acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive
at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific ad-
vances.
37
The "general scientific acceptance" approach has no standing in
light of legal theory and should be abolished. However, even if this
standard is retained, it arguably has been met by the reliability figures
previously related and the widespread use of the polygraph by law en-
forcement, government and private industry.38 In either event, this
criticism seems unjustified as an explanation for the absolute exclusion
of polygraphic evidence at trial.
35. 293 F. at 1014.
36. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
37. McCORMmcK, supra note 8, § 203, at 491 (footnotes omitted).
38. The Polygraph, supra note 29, at 111.
1977]
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3. The polygraph is scientifically unacceptable because extra-
neous factors may invalidate the results and there is a potential of beat-
ing the machine.
Factually, it cannot be denied that extraneous factors, such as any
physiological or psychological abnormalities of the examinee, may
cause deviations in test results. However, such criticism is abated by
the degree of competency of the examiner. A trained, competent ex-
aminer should recognize physiological and psychological abnormalities
and should make the appropriate adjustments.80 Such factors should
not pose a problem concerning the admissibility of polygraphic evi-
dence if state legislative bodies are willing to establish high standards
for examiner competence. Further, defects in the examination process
may be used as damaging impeachment tools for the cross-examiner.
The polygraph has also been criticized because of the belief that
the machine can be beaten. This criticism is of minimal significance:
The lie detector's critics set forth numerous methods which
allegedly may be used to "beat" the device. Among those
most often cited are the ability to consciously control mental
sets and .attitudes, rationalization of the event, breathing con-
trol, muscular movements and psychological evasion. There
is little doubt that the instrument not only can be but has
been "beaten." However, the type of person capable of this
feat is a very rare individual.
Furthermore, the modem polygraph has built-in safe-
guards against the common physical attempts to distort the
results. The "evasive conduct itself is just as significant...
as the responses that are revealed in the tracings of lying sub-
jects who do not seek to evade detection by the process."
The remaining psychological attempts are successful too in-
frequently to seriously affect the reliability of the polygraph
examination.4"
The incidence of "beating" the polygraph is likely to occur with no
greater frequency than that of "beating" a jury. In any event, this
criticism should not preclude admissibility of polygraphic evidence, but
rather is a matter properly for a jury to consider in deciding what
weight is to be given to the polygraphic evidence.
Jury System Criticisms
1. Use of the polygraph invades the province of the jury by de-
termining the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.
39. Id. at 121.
40. Id. at 123-24 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 12:682
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This type of criticism is the natural result of using a judicial notice
standard to determine the admissibility of polygraphic evidence. Be-
cause the standard is so high, polygraphic evidence, if admitted, carries
a conclusive image. This criticism is best answered by addressing two
questions: (1) Does the polygraph inherently invade the province of
the jury, and (2) Is the polygraph the only scientific device that seeks
to determine the ultimate issue?
In response to the first question, if courts continue to follow the
standard of judicial notice, the polygraph must inevitably invade the
province of the jury with its conclusive nature.41 However, if the poly-
graphy and the polygraph examiner are accorded the same treatment
by the courts as that given any other expert witness, a system may yet
be devised whereby the polygraph is not given conclusive status and
its results would be admissible.42 Under such a system, the polygraph
examiner would be present for cross-examination and his credibility,
and that of his interpretations, could be loosely scrutinized and im-
peached.
Furthermore, the jury could be given a strong and enlightening
instruction on use of the polygraphic evidence during their delibera-
tions.43 The court could instruct that, as with the opinion of any other
expert witness, the evidence may be given great weight, little weight
or may be totally disregarded as the jury sees fit. As one court has
noted:
The problem which has traditionally caused the courts the
greatest concern . . . is the possibility that the jury might
consider the examiner's opinion to be so conclusive on the
issue of guilt or innocence as to intrude upon and usurp its
historical role and prerogatives. The question is whether the
feared tendency of the jury to attach exaggerated significance
to the examiner's testimony can be controlled. Carefully
conducted trial procedure can offer opportunities to alert the
jurors to the value and limitations of polygraph technique. It
is contemplated that the foundation for the examiner's
opinion will be required to include sufficient information to
enable the jury to make an intelligent evaluation. Vigorous
cross-examination of the examiner and other expert wit-
nesses will expose inadequacies which may have affected the
41. See note 8 supra.
42. This provision is subject, of course, to the qualification of the polygraph exam-
iner as an expert and a foundation laid as to thi conditions surrounding the examination.
For an analysis of the qualification of an expert, see McConmcrm, supra note 8, § 13.
43. The Polygraph, supra note 29, at 123.
1977]
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results of a particular examination. Instructions to the ex-
aminer and to the jury can also clarify and distinguish the role
that each is to play. . . After considering the basis of the
examiner's opinion and the other foundational material pre-
sented, the jury may perform its customary duty of attaching
whatever significance to the opinion that it believes is war-
ranted.44
As outlined, the foregoing procedure establishes a framework around
which a rational and legally acceptable system may be developed for
the admissibility of polygraphic evidence.
Regarding the second question, the polygraph cannot be consid-
ered the only scientific device which seeks to resolve ultimate issues
of fact. In paternity proceedings, the use of blood grouping tests cer-
tainly relate to the ultimate issue.45 In addition, in criminal extortion
cases where threats are made over the telephone, voiceprint analyses
offer an answer to the ultimate issue in contention." In drug use and
drug possession cases, the Nalline test also goes to the ultimate issue
of use or posesssion of particular drugs.47 These are but a few ex-
amples of how science encroaches upon the dominion of the legal sys-
tem; yet few people would seek to exclude such knowledge from the
record on the basis that it invades the province of the jury.
2. The admission of the polygraph as a judicial tool will ulti-
mately mean the demise of the jury system.
Some critics foresee the day when, instead of a jury, the accused
will stand before a machine that unerringly decides issues of guilt or
innocence.48 These critics lack the capacity to visualize a system
whereby the polygraph takes its place along side other tools of science
currently employed in jury trials.
A system which requires a proper foundation for the introduction
of polygraphic evidence, demands a high level of competence for poly-
graph examiners and gives the jury complete freedom to weigh and
evaluate polygraphic evidence does not mean the demise of the jury
system; to the contrary, it calls for increased reliance on the jury and
higher reliability of jury verdicts.
44. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 691 (D.D.C.) rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
45. See McCoRmicK, supra note 8, § 211.
46. See, e.g., State v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
47. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
4. United States v. Ridling 350 F. Supp. 90, 98 (E.D, Mich, 1972).
[Vol. 12:682
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Constitutional Criticisms
1. The use of polygraph violates the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
This criticism ignores the realities of polygraphic evidence. A
valid polygraph examination cannot be taken from an unwilling subject.
The results would not be susceptible to interpretation because of the
coercive psychological atmosphere surrounding such a test. The poly-
graph test can be administered only to a willing, voluntary subject.
Moreover, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion may be waived if it is made knowingly, intelligently and voluntar-
ily.49  So long as these rights are clearly made known to the subject
and a valid consent is obtained, the test itself could be considered a
valid waiver of the privilege. Even if consenting to the test is not itself
a valid waiver, there would be little judicial difficulty in informing the
subject of his rights and obtaining a sworn, signed waiver of his rights
after consultation with counsel. Just as an accused may waive his right
against self-incrimination and make a valid confession, 0 so should one
be free to waive this right and subject himself to polygraph examina-
tion. A rational system, premised on the idea that one must be in-
formed of his rights, given time to analyze his situation, and allowed
to consult with counsel before his rights are waived, should fully protect
the rights of willing subjects as well as those not wishing to be tested.
2. The use of the polygraph violates the sixth amendment rights
to cross-examination and confrontation.
According to one court, "the weight of authority . . . give[s]
other cogent reasons for its inadaptability as an instrument of evidence
in the trial of cases, such as the impossibility of cross examining the
machine." 51 Under similar reasoning, blood tests, x-rays, fingerprints
and drug analysis tests could not be used as evidence, since these de-
vices cannot respond verbally to cross-examination. To the contrary,
however, all of these scientific devices are regularly admitted as evi-
dence in any court. Clearly, the polygraph, like any other scientific
device or test used by the legal system, may be confronted and cross-
examined by counsel simply by requiring the polygraph examiner to
testify. The polygraph is merely a machine which, if kept in proper
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-79 (1966).
50. Id.
51. Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim, 45, 52, 230 P.2d 495, 502 (1951).
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working condition, accurately records physiological reactions.5 2 It is
the examiner who must be confronted and subjected to the rigors of
cross-examination as the interpreter of the recorded data. Just as there
is no advantage in introducing into evidence a fingerprint or a bullet
without calling an expert to interpet the analysis of the proffered evi-
dence, a polygraph chart, by itself, is equally meaningless without ex-
planation. While the present procedure of total polygraphic exclusion
sidesteps this issue, an approach should be developed whereby poly-
graph tracings would be admissible only after a proper foundation was
laid by the testimony of the expert, without comment upon the ultimate
issue of guilt or innocence.53
A PROCEDURE FOR THE ADMISSION OF
POLYGRAPHiC EVIDENCE
The development of a rational and legally acceptable procedure
for the admission of polygraphic evidence may take one of three forms:
(1) judicial decisions; (2) a joint effort by the judiciary and state legis-
latures; or (3) action taken solely by state legislatures. Under any of
these three forms of action, the criticisms previously discussed compel
the following requirements: (1) a high level of examiner competency;
(2) the use of superior equipment; (3) strict evidentiary rules and jury
instructions; and (4) strict standards for the waiver of constitutional
rights.
The first two requirements may be met in one of two ways. First,
the courts could require, in establishing a foundation for the introduc-
tion of polygraphic evidence, that certain levels of competency and
minimal machine capabilities be established. This approach, however,
leaves to each trial judge's discretion the decision of whether such re-
quirements are met.
The second approach provides a more rational answer. Legisla-
tion should be drafted and approved setting high minimum standards
for licensing polygraph examiners and high minimum standards for
equipment. Presently in Oklahoma, the polygraph examiner is gov-
erned by statutes passed in 1971. 54 However, these statutes do not
establish sufficiently high standards to protect against less than minimal
"52. The Polygraph, supra note 29, at 112-13.
53. See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. OKxLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 1451-1476 (1971 & Supp. 1976).
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competency.55 The statutes require only a two channel polygraph, 50 al-
though the science has developed several other reliable channels which
are included on many new polygraphs.57  The statutes also establish
minimum educational standards for operator licensing by requiring
polygraph examiners: (1) to have a baccalaureate degree from an ac-
credited university or, in the alternative, a high school diploma and five
years experience; (2) to be a graduate of a board certified polygraph
examiners course followed by a six-month internship; and (3) to pass
a board examination. These standards initially appear sufficient; how-
ever, it has been suggested that a minimum of two years of college
should be required and that the training course be extended to six
months.518 Establishing a high licensing and examination standard for
polygraph examiners would insure more confidence by courts faced
with the decision of whether to allow polygraph experts to testify at
trial.
To meet the third requirement, the courts or legislatures should
establish well-defined courtroom procedures for the admission of poly-
graphic evidence. These procedures should include testimony as to the
qualifications of the operator as an expert in the field; a description
of the equipment used and the environment at the time of testing; the
examiner's opinion of the physiological and psychological state of the
individual examined; an explanation of the subject's rights and his
waiver thereof; whether the results of the test were conclusive; and a
recital of the questions asked of the subject and his responses. All of
this information should be taken by the court in camera but should
be recorded and made part of the trial record. The trial judge could
then rule on the admissibility of the polygraphic evidence based on his
satisfaction as to expertise and relevancy as balanced against the possi-
bility of prejudice.59 This ruling should be considered a final order
and subject to interlocutory appeal. Of course, if the court decides to
admit the evidence, the expert should be called as a witness.
Moreover, the expert should be allowed to testify about the sub-
ject's reactions to the questions and to express his expert opinion as
55. Comment, Polygraphic Evidence: The Case for Admissibility Upon Stipulation
of The Parties, 9 TuLSA Li. 250, 264-67 (1973).
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1454 (1971).
57. Comment, The Polygraphic Technique A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKm L. Rzv.
330, 330-31 (1971). See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
58. Comment, Polygraphic Evidence: The Case for Admissibility Upon Stipulation
of The Parties, 9 TULsk Li. 250, 267 (1973).
59. See McCownmcK, supra note 8, § 185.
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to the truthfulness of the responses. The polygraph examiner should
not be allowed to give his conclusions as to the subject's guilt or inno-
cence and should be instructed of this restriction prior to taking the
witness stand. An interim instruction should be made to the jury
promptly after the first polygraph expert testifies as to their freedom
to weigh and evaluate expert testimony. Such an instruction would
give the jury time to evaluate the testimony of the expert before mak-
ing a decision. More importantly, it would make the jury aware that
the polygraph is not conclusive evidence and that they should remain
objective until all the evidence has been heard.
When instructing the jury prior to their adjournment for delibera-
tion, the judge should instruct the jurors as to the consideration
they should give to polygraphic evidence. Either by legislative or ju-
dicial fiat, a standard mandatory polygraphic evidence instruction
should be adopted. Such an instruction might read:
The polygraph is just a machine. It depends on a human
operator to interpret its data and is therefore, like any other
human development, not infallible. You have heard the
qualifications of the experts who have testified here and you
have heard their interpretations based on their training,
knowledge and experience. But this evidence does not de-
cide the issue of guilt or innocence. That decision is in your
power. You are to weigh and evaluate the testimony of each
of the polygraph experts which testified here. You may de-
cide whether to believe them or not. You may give their
testimony much significance, little significance or even no
significance. That decision and the decision as to guilt or
innocence are decisions only you, the jury, can make based
upon all the evidence before you.
The major points to be covered in the polygraph instruction are
that polygraphic evidence is only expert opinion and may be fallible,
that the jury has the task of weighing and evaluating those opinions,
and that the jury may reach a conclusion opposite that reached by the
polygraph expert. Such an instruction should respect the polygraph,
but not deify it, and should clearly advise the jury of its powers in rela-
tion to polygraphic evidence.
Because of the inherent distrust of the polygraph and the fears
of its awesome potential, any waiver of the right against self-incrimina-
tion should be strictly construed. The procedure for the admission of
polygraphic evidence should include a mandatory means for waiver of
this right. Prior to testing, the subject should be taken before a judge,
[Vol. 12:682
15
Salisbury: Fulton v. State and Anderson v. State: Insurmountable Barriers fo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
ROLE OF THE POLYGRAPH
sworn, and advised of his right not to take the test. Then, if he wishes
to be tested, his statement of his waiver of his right against self-incrim-
ination should be made. All of this should become a matter of record
and appended to the transcript of the trial. This proposed procedure
should protect a subject from being coerced into taking a test and si-
multaneously protect the court and the prosecutor from later attacks
as to the validity of the waiver.
CONCLUSION
The history of the polygraph, both in Oklahoma and across the
nation, has been one of judicial exclusion based on an unreasonable
standard, outdated statistics and outmoded equipment. Many criti-
cisms of the polygraph have been raised; however, both logical analysis
and reference to current technology demonstrate that these criticisms
can be effectively answered. The polygraph has come of age and the
time has come when the courts must reconsider their position on its
role in the courtroom.
Proponents of the polygraph must be prepared to meet judicial
criticism leveled at the machine by the courts and must propose a ra-
tional and legally acceptable standard to replace outmoded precedent.
Modem evidentiary proposals concerning polygraph evidence must
withstand time-honored criticisms, be legally sound and judicially work-
able. Such a system must strive and attain high levels of examiner
competency, equipment superiority and test validity. Finally, it must
furnish safeguards against constitutional violations and yet not insulate
the defendant from the swift and proper administration of justice.
Thomas E. Salisbury
EDITOR'S NOTE: Since the original text of this comment was
prepared, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals have addressed issues in the polygraphic evi-
dence area. In Hames v. Anderson, 48 O.B.J. 2333 (1977), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, per Justice Lavender, was faced with
the question of whether reference to a witness' willingness to take
a polygraph test in a civil jury trial constituted reversible error.
Without expressing an opinion as to the admissibility of poly-
graphic evidence, the court held that although reference to the
willingness of a witness to submit to a polygraph examination
1977]
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss4/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
was incompetent, such evidence must be prejudicial to constitute
reversible error. The court concluded that no such prejudice
was shown. Dissenting in Hames, Justice Hodges cited to criminal
case law excluding polygraphic evidence and argued, by analogy
to the prejudice accompanying references to insurance in civil trials,
that references to a polygraph were prejudicial and therefore con-
stituted reversible error.
In State v. Cook, 49 O.B.J. 159 (1978), the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals, per Justice Brett and joined by Justice
Cornish, held that although the results of a polygraph test were
inadmissible, a trial judge in a criminal nonjury trial may con-
sider the defendant's willingness to submit to a polygraph examina-
tion. In resolving this question, the court expressly avoided a
reconsideration of the holdings in Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871
(Okla. Crim. App. 1975), and Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495
(Okla. Crim. App. 1951), generally emphasizing the "increased
scientific reliability of the polygraph." Although the Hames and
Cook decisions may be read as introducing a greater degree of
judicial tolerance toward polygraphic examinations in Oklahoma,
whether recent technological advancements in the polygraph area
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